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Introduction
One can make a proven secure signature scheme [9, 11] based on anyone way function. Unfortunately all proven secure signature schemes [7, 9, 1, 11, 2] are very impractical (to make some of them more practical the authentication tree could be used instead of pseudo random functions but this approach requires a lot of memory). So from a practical viewpoint it could be advantageous to use symmetric authentication schemes, however one then loses the signature property. In the classical notion of arbiter [8, p. 409] the arbiter has to be active when messages are transmitted.
Simmons [14] introduced unconditionally secure authentication schemes with arbitration. From a functional viewpoint the arbiter is not active, in Simmons' * Part 6f this work was done while he was visiting professor at University of New scheme, during the transmission of the authenticated message while in the classical notion the arbiter must be active. Desmedt and Yung [6] (see also Brickell and Stinson [4] ) improved Simmons' scheme by protecting the receiver against an impersonation (substitution) attack by the arbiter. Unfortunately a.ll these schemes can only be used once (because otherwise they lose their security) and hence new keys have to be distributed for each new message as in a one time pad. The purpose of this paper is to develop a practical proven secure conditional authentication scheme with arbitration. Our scheme has some similarities with [10] , however our scheme is non-interactive and the keys can be re-used.
Definitions
Let us call S the sender, R the receiver, A the arbiter, and 0 the outside opponent. We can distinguish three stages in Simmons' solution [141. The three stages are:
The key initialization phase in which S, R and A interact to come up with the necessary keys.
The authentication phase in which R receives a message and wants to ascertain that the message is authentic. A does not interact in this stage. The dispute phase in which A is requested to resolve a dispute between Sand R. Using some information gathered by A during the initialization phase A solves the dispute.
Our scheme contains these three stages as well. Let us describe more precisely the threats with which we are faced. We follow closely Simmons's description of such threats (for the first three threats see [14] ).
The outside opponent. The outsider, 0, can try to impersonate the sender and/or substitute some message(s) for one sent from S to R, but which 0 has intercepted (actively eavesdropped). The attack is said to be successful if and only if R accepts the message as authentic when it is not.
The sender. A dishonest S can attempt to cheat by sending a message which R will accept as authentic, but which he can later deny having sent. The attack is successful if and only if the following two conditions hold. First, R accepts the fraudulent message, and second, in a dispute A will decide that the message is not authentic.
The receiver. A dishonest R can falsely claim to have received the message M from S. Two sub cases can be distinguished: R never received a message at all, or R has received some authentic message(s) from S which he tries to alter. The attack is successful if and only if in a dispute A certifies the message as being authentic.
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The arbiter. A dishonest A can send a message to R which R will accept as authentic. As in the case of the opponent's attack the arbiter can either choose an impersonation or a substitution attack.
The attack is successful if and only if the message originating at A will be accepted by R.
We remark that it is not A's task to force R to accept messages originating from S.
The reader who is interested in formalizing the above informal definitions is referred to [6] . Although these definitions have been given for unconditionally secure schemes, they can very easily be adapted for conditionally secure ones.
. The Scheme
We use S for the sender, R for the receiver and A for the arbiter. We assume the existence of a conditionally proven secure authentication scheme. When we mention keys we assume that these (symmetric) keys were chosen according to a prescribed algorithm and belong to the set K.
Distribution Phase
Step 1 A sends S an ordered tuple (kl' k 2 , ••• , k n ) of random, independently chosen, keys privately.
Step 2 A chooses with uniform probability distribution a random subset, I, of l n/2 J indices between 1 and n and privately sends to R the tuple (k~, k~, ... , k~) where k~ = k, if i E I, otherwise ki = f, where f ~ K, (for example ( may be the empty string).
Step 3 S privately sends a key, kn+!' to R.
Authentication Phase
To send a message M the sender S forms n + 1 message authentication codes (M ACs) by processing the message with each of the n + 1 keys, n provided by the arbiter and one by himself, using a proven secure authentication scheme. Call these MAGs MAG1,MAG2, ... , MAG n +!. The sender sends (M, MAGI, MAG2, ... , M AGn+d where MAGi is generated using the key k i , the message M and the agreed authentication algorithm to R.
To verify whether R should accept M as (probably) being authentic R proceeds as follows: if k: :f. f then R checks that M ACi is correct, and does this for all i, 1 $ i $ n, and additionally checks if M AC n +l also matches. If these l n/2J + 1 MAGs are correct R accepts M as authentic, otherwise R rejects. In the case R rejects R erases his keys and requests new keys unless all the MAGs were wrong. 
Proof of Security
We will use h as a security parameter so that the complexity of performing an attack on the underlying authentication scheme is bounded above by l/p (h) where p is any polynomial. We assume 5 receives feedback from R whether he has accepted the message M or not.
Theorem 1. Let n in our scheme be chosen linear in h the security param-
eter. Now if a conditionally proven secure authentication scheme exists then our scheme is secure against a denial attack by the sender, conditionally secure against an attack in which the receiver, the arbiter or an outsider attempts to modify the message or impersonate the sender.
Proof. The receiver's attack will not succeed as he does not know enough keys and the authentication scheme was assumed to be secure. A similar proof holds for the arbiter's and an outsider's attacks. We now consider denial by the sender.
We do not consider M AC n + t as this was used only to protect against the arbiter.
If the sender wishes to have a false message accepted and then deny sending the message he optimizes his chance of winning by adopting a game plan. He Our assumption that 5 receives feedback from R whether a message M was accepted or not implies 5 can win next time if he guesses all the indices of the . keys, kj = f, and sends the MACis of these n -In/2J keys correctly and all other M ACs incorrectly. In this case R will reject the message but not erase his keys (so R will not ask for new keys). The probability of this suc~eeding without detection is also 1 So the probability is negligible of an attack succeeding (even if repeated 3 polynomially many times). 0
Conclusions
We have presented an authentication scheme with arbiter which is unconditionally secure against denial by the sender of having sent a message and conditionally secure against a receiver impersonating the sender or substituting a message and conditionally secure against a similar fraud by the arbiter. The security obtained is the same as for the symmetric authentication scheme on which it is based. We observe that making practical proven secure authentication schemes is easy to achieve starting from pseudo-noise generators [12, 13] and unconditionally secure authentication schemes [5] .
It is clear that the scheme presented in Section 3, can be adapted for DES. We remind the reader that DES is not a proven secure scheme and that some weaknesses have been found in the protocol for generating M ACs [3] .
